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Executive Summary 
 
This report summarizes some basic results of California’s June 2012 “Top-Two” primary.  It 
focuses on legislative offices with multiple districts within the state:  California State Assembly, 
California State Senate, and United States House of Representatives.   
 
 There Are Some Same Party Runoffs.  Across the 153 California State 
Assembly, California State Senate, and United States Representative primary 
contests, the new “top-two” primary (implemented alongside new legislative 
districts) generated 9 Republican-vs.-Republican races and 20 Democrat-vs.-
Democrat races.   
 Many Races Remain Uncompetitive.  In almost 60% of the primaries in the 
Assembly, State Senate, and House elections, the first place candidate in the 
primary earned more than 50% of the vote and is likely to win the general 
election. 
 Typically One Candidate Has Broad Support.  Most first place candidates 
received at least 25% of the vote, lowering the odds that extreme candidates 
would win the primary through excessive splitting of the electorate in races with 
many candidates.   
 Same-Party Runoffs Make the ‘Uncompetitive’ Competitive.  Some districts 
that would normally be uncompetitive because they favor one party now have 
competitive races with same-party runoffs.   
 Some Voters Backed Candidates Unlikely to Win.  In primary elections with at 
least four candidates, many voters cast their ballots for candidates that placed 
fourth or worse; in about 2/3rds of those elections the votes cast for “lost causes” 
exceeded the difference between the second and third place candidates.  
 
The data for this report comes from the California Target Book.  The James Irvine Foundation 
funded this research through a grant to the California Institute of Technology.   
 
Introduction 
 
There are two key differences between the “semi-closed” primary election law California used 
from 2002-2010 and the state’s new “top-two” primary in 2012.  The first change allowed any 
voter to vote for any candidate; if a Republican voter wants to vote for a Democratic-identifying 
candidate, the “top-two” law allows this voter to do so.  The second change redefined the 
purpose of the primary: while the old law selected the nominees of each party to compete in the 
general election, the new “top-two” primary selects the two candidates with the most votes for 
the November general election, even if they are from the same party.  If two Democrats get the 
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most votes in the primary, then the November election features those two Democrats and no 
other candidates (“write-in” candidates are only allowed in the primary).     
 
Californians passed the “top-two” primary law in the same election cycle as redistricting reform.  
The new Citizens Redistricting Commission carried out the usual decennial redistricting, instead 
of the legislature, and drew the political map of California.  The two reforms jointly provided a 
unique opportunity to study rare events like elections between two incumbent politicians.  While 
the coincidence of redistricting and the first use of the top-two primary produced opportunities 
for study in individual districts, though, the reforms may have a joint effect; as a consequence, 
both laws influence the results presented here.        
 
Table 1: Results of the June Primary: Types of Races for November 
Type 
Rep. 
v. 
Rep. 
Rep. 
v. 
Dem. 
Dem. 
v. 
Dem. 
Rep. 
v. 
Oth. 
Dem. 
v. 
Oth. Unopp. Total 
Assembly 7 57 12 0 2 2 80 
Senate 0 16 2 0 2 0 20 
House 2 41 6 1 3 0 53 
Total 9 114 20 1 7 2 153 
 
As a result of these new laws, many voters will see something quite different than what they saw 
in the past for November general elections:  “same-party runoffs.”  Across the three types of 
offices analyzed here, there will be nine Republican-on-Republican races, twenty Democrat-on-
Democrat races, and eight races where a “No Party Preference” or third party candidate won the 
second spot in the “top-two.”  Altogether, 114 of the 153 races (about 75%) are traditional 
Republican against Democrat elections.    
 
At the Assembly level, only just above 70% of the races will feature a Republican against a 
Democrat.  In two races, a Democratic candidate ran unopposed and no write-in candidate 
qualified (AD14 and AD64); in several other districts, a write-in candidate managed to qualify 
for the November ballot even though only one candidate appeared on the June primary ballot.  
For example, in AD31, James Bennett (R) received 299 write-in votes and qualified for the 
November election.   
 
Overall, many voters in California will face a new type of general election in November: the 
same party runoff.  While some of this is attributable directly to redistricting (for example: the 
race between incumbent Democrats Brad Sherman and Howard Berman in Congressional 
District 30), some of the same-party runoffs occur in open seats as well.  The aggregate state 
totals can tell us a little bit about how we got here, what happened in the primary, and how 
reasonable were those results.   
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Competitiveness 
 
The definition of a “competitive primary” in the top-two setting is debatable.  One possible way 
to measure competitiveness is to look at the difference between the vote for the 2
nd
 place and 3
rd
 
place candidates.  Since the top-two candidates make the general election ballot, arguably the 
most important measure of competitiveness is what percent of the vote separates the last 
candidate on the November ballot from the alternative candidate who fell short.  Many of the 
races did feature relatively competitive contests for the second and final slot on the November 
ballot.   
 
Figure 1: Competitiveness in the Race for 2nd Place 
 
 
In nearly thirty races less than five percentage points separated second from third place in the 
June Primary (among races with at least three candidates).  Almost sixty of these races were 
within ten points.  Some races, though, were still quite uncompetitive; a handful had third place 
candidates earning virtually none of the vote.  Furthermore, 47 of the 153 Assembly, State 
Senate, and House elections had no more than two candidates; in those elections both candidates 
on the ballot advanced automatically regardless of their vote totals.    
 
Another perspective involves looking at the vote share of the first-place candidate.  A first-place 
candidate with a vote share over fifty percent is likely to win the November election against any 
of the alternative candidates.  Of the eighty Assembly races, half featured a first place candidate 
who won more than fifty percent of the vote (see Table 2, below).  The twenty State Senate races 
tended to be less competitive; in only four, or twenty percent, of those did the first place 
candidate get less than half of the primary vote.  The primary elections for United States 
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Representative fall between those two extremes; about two-thirds featured a candidate who won 
more than half the vote.  Overall, nearly sixty percent of all the races featured a candidate who 
got more than fifty percent of the vote.  While some of these races may turn out to be surprises in 
November because of the additional campaigning, differences in the general and primary 
election voters, or other reasons, the overall picture is that many of the top-two races will not be 
very competitive in November.           
 
Table 2: How many races will be really competitive in November? 
1st Place Vote Share Assembly Senate House Total 
Under 50 Percent 40 4 18 62 
 
50% 20% 34% 41% 
Over 50 Percent 40 16 35 91 
 
50% 80% 66% 59% 
Total Number Districts 80 20 53 153 
 
Some races will feature very little competition in the general election.  Figure 2, below, provides 
more detail about what fraction of the vote the first place candidate received.  A number of races 
featured a first place candidate with not just more than fifty percent of the vote, but also more 
than sixty percent (52 out of the 153 Assembly, Senate, and House races).  Most of the 
candidates who earned between 95-100% of the vote were either unopposed or faced only write-
in campaigns (allowed in the primary but not in the general election).   
 
Figure 2.  Vote share of 1
st
 Place Candidate (Assembly, State Senate, House).   
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The data presented in Figure 2 also point to a more optimistic interpretation of the top-two 
primary as well: it rarely produced first place candidates with small shares of the vote.  In 
Congressional District 8, the first (Gregg Imus, R) and second (Paul Cook, R) place candidates 
earned 16% and 15% of the vote in a field of ten Republicans, two Democrats, and one “No 
Party Preference” candidate.  The third place candidate (Phil Liberatore, R) fell 240 votes shy of 
Cook.  One risk with many candidates and a top-two primary is that the vote splits between so 
many possible contenders that two candidates from the same party desired by a very small 
number of voters (in this case, 31% between both Imus and Cook) could end up as the only 
alternatives.  The data in Figure 2 shows that the Imus-Cook election is a rare event; in just about 
every election at least one candidate got more than 25% of the vote.  The number of candidates 
in the election does tend to decrease the size of the first place candidate’s share, although the 
data is quite noisy (Figure 3, below). 
 
Figure 3: Vote Share of First Place Candidate and the Number of Candidates 
 (“1” implies a same party runoff, “0” otherwise.)   
    
 
Two stories emerge about competitiveness, then.  On one hand, the top-two primary operating in 
conjunction with new legislative districts appears to have produced many uncompetitive races – 
as did the old primary election system.  On the other hand, the ‘worst case’ scenario of extreme 
candidates winning because the electorate split many ways between more moderate candidates 
appears to certainly be a rare case.  So, while the new primary did not suddenly make more 
primaries competitive, it does not appear to have made for dramatically less competitive 
elections either.   
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Majority Minority Districts 
 
With California’s large Latino population, Latinos are a majority in many districts.  Of the 37 
districts across the Assembly, State Senate, and House races that have more than half of their 
2010 census population identified as Latino, 7 feature same-Party Democratic runoffs (18.9%).  
Of the 116 districts without a Latino majority, 13 feature same-Party Democratic runoffs 
(11.2%).  Nevertheless, about the same proportion in both (73% of Latino-majority districts, 
75% of other districts) have traditional Republican-on-Democrat races in November.  The 
remaining races include unopposed Democrats and Democrats against other candidates (No 
Party Preference, Peace and Freedom, and so on).  The percent difference in same-party runoffs 
between majority Latino districts and other districts, although true, is in practical terms also very 
small.     
    
Figure 4: Latino Population in California Assembly, State Senate, and House Districts 
      
There are other ways to think about race and ethnicity and the results of the new primary.  Figure 
5, below, plots the relationship between the percent of the district population that identifies as 
“White, Non-Hispanic” and the percent of the voters registered with the Republican Party.  The 
general trend in this plot moves up the page and to the right, signally a positive relationship 
between the percent of white voters and the percent of voters registered with the Republican 
Party in each district.  The ones and zeros on the plot represent whether or not the race is a same-
party Democratic runoff: if the marker is a “1” it is a race with two Democrats in November, if it 
is a “0” then it is not. 
 
Notably in Figure 5, there are no Democrat-on-Democrat general elections for districts with 
more than 30% of the electorate registered with the Republican Party.  However, there are 
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elections with both high and low percentages of white voters in Democratic districts that produce 
Democrat-on-Democrat elections.  The implication of Figure 5 is that the probability of a same-
party Democratic runoff is more related to Democratic strength than to racial or ethnic 
composition.   
 
Figure 5: Race, Party, and Primary Type; Same Party Democratic Runoffs Marked as “1.” 
 
 
“Strategic Desertion” 
 
Weak parties or candidates may experience “strategic desertion” when voters believe candidates 
are unlikely to win an election.  The intuition behind this idea rests with the preferences of 
voters: a voter may not want to “waste” her vote on a candidate who has no chance of winning.  
Interpreting this idea for the top-two primary in California, voters may perceive the three 
strongest candidates as potential winners.  Votes for weaker candidates – those that finished 
fourth or worse – may be considered “wasted,” although there are many reasons a voter may 
desire to cast such a ballot aside from influencing the outcome of this election.  For example, a 
voter could decide to simply vote for the candidate she most prefers, regardless of the 
candidate’s electoral strength (“sincere voting”).     
 
Voters may also find it difficult to coordinate on an alternative candidate in races with many 
choices, even if they wish to do so.  One measure of whether or not a “coordination failure” may 
have occurred is if the percent of the vote for the 4
th
 (and on to the last place candidate) exceeds 
the difference between the second and third place candidate.  That is, if all the voters who picked 
the fourth to last place candidate picked the third place candidate, the result of the election would 
be different.  In the races with at least four candidates, this happens frequently. 
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Figure 6.  Potential Coordination Failures. 
 
Out of 64 races (Assembly, State Senate, and US House) with at least four candidates, voters 
may have lost an opportunity to change the outcome in 40 of them (if they all voted for the third 
place candidate instead).  This is particularly interesting because these coordination failures may 
be associated with “same party” runoffs --- the situation where one party splits enough of the 
vote so that two candidates of the other party advance to the November election.   
 
Table 3.  Potential Coordination Failures and Same Party Runoffs 
 (Minimum Number of Candidates = 4).   
Possible 
Coordination 
Failure? 
Other 
Election 
Type 
Same 
Party 
Runoff Total 
No 20 4 24 
 
83.33% 16.67% 100% 
Yes 25 15 40 
 
62.5% 37.5% 100% 
Total 45 19 64 
 
70.31% 29.69% 100% 
 
The most problematic example of this kind of coordination failure occurred in Congressional 
District 31.  CD31 features a race between two Republicans in November: Gary Miller (an 
incumbent) and Bob Dutton.  In the primary, Miller earned 27% of the vote and Dutton earned 
25%.  Four Democrats also ran, splitting between them 48% of the vote.  The closest Democrat, 
Pete Aguilar, had 23% of the vote; that meant that the fourth, fifth, and sixth place Democrats 
split 25% of the vote.  Since the difference between Dutton and Aguilar was only 2%, these 
votes for later-place Democrats cost the Democratic Party an opportunity to have a candidate in a 
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Congressional District in which the Democrats have a six point registration advantage over the 
Republicans and 49% of the population is Latino and 12% is African-American.   
 
The Miller-Dutton type of election is an outlier in the general trend, though.  Table 4, below, 
shows the types of elections that occur in different kinds of districts: Republican leaning 
districts, Democratic leaning districts, and districts in which Republican and Democratic 
registration numbers are within five percentage points (“toss-ups”).  There is one race (Miller-
Dutton) between two Republicans in a Democratic leaning district and no elections between two 
Democrats in Republican leaning districts.  These results hold true even if the “toss-up” category 
is eliminated and we just look at the difference between Republican and Democratic registration.  
Even if the Miller-Dutton type race is not normatively optimal, it is rare.        
 
Table 4:  Election Type by District Type 
Election 
Type 
Rep. 
Dist. 
Dem. 
Dist. Toss-Up Total 
R. v. R.  8 1 0 9 
R. v. D. 31 69 14 114 
D. v. D. 0 20 0 20 
R. v. Oth. 1 0 0 1 
D. v. Oth. 0 7 0 7 
Unopposed 0 2 0 2 
Total 41 98 14 153 
 
Party Composition of the California Assembly 
 
This aggregate data can give us a sense of the likelihood one party or another wins a seat in 
November.  Figure 7, below, plots two interesting quantities.  The first, on the horizontal axis, is 
the difference between the percent of the electorate registered with the Democrats and the 
Republicans.  A score of negative five, for example, would mean that the Republicans had five 
percentage points more of the electorate registered with their party than with the Democrats.  
Conversely, a score of positive five would mean the Democrats had an advantage over the 
Republicans.  A score of zero would represent a district tied between with any amount of 
unaffiliated and third party registration.  Note that most districts in California lie to the right of 
zero in Figure 7 because the state tends towards the Democrats.   
 
The vertical axis in Figure 7 represents the vote share of the first place candidate in the June 
2012 primary in each of the Assembly districts.  Candidates above 50% are likely winners 
regardless of the primary type.  At the Assembly level, no same-party runoffs of one party occur 
in districts that favor the other party by registration, so the same party runoffs below the 50% 
line are going to stay within that party regardless of who wins the election.  The interesting races 
between the parties occur in the relatively few races below the 50% horizontal line and near the 
0% Democratic-to-Republican registration vertical line.   
 
Not all of those races will be competitive, of course.  If the candidate of one party earned about 
40% of the vote and two candidates from the other party earned about 60% of the vote, the 
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second place finisher will perhaps have a better chance to win the election.  As a rough measure, 
though, this plot shows how few races really are “toss-ups” in November between the parties.   
 
Figure 7.  Partisanship and Primary Results.  A “1” indicates a same-party runoff.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The “top-two” primary, coupled with redistricting reform, has certainly changed the political 
landscape of California.  So far, it has produced neither the outcomes hoped for by the most 
optimistic supporters nor the dire consequences predicted by its detractors.  Some legislative 
races will be more competitive in the general election than they would be otherwise.  A very few 
showed the potential downsides of the new primary system.  Of course, much will be learned 
after November 6, 2012; once the general election outcomes of these legislative races throughout 
California are settled, we will be able to evaluate the effects of electoral reforms like the top-two 
primary in more detail.  
 
There are several important avenues of exploration for researchers after the November election.  
The data presented here in this brief report just outlines the starting point for this future work.  
That work will address issues such as: how much money did campaigns and outside groups 
spend – and what effect did it have?  Did candidates who appeared strong in the primaries win in 
the general elections?  Did any of the third-party or nonpartisan candidates win?  Furthermore, 
researchers will have to wait until the legislators take office to find out what they do once they 
are there; it will take some time before political scientists, politicians, and policy makers can 
produce their final analysis of this new primary election law.    
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